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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
113 is for the time being merely to refuse the right to bring a FELA action to
the more punctilious employer or claimant who by his conduct clearly shows
that he has knowingly given up his federal remedy but who orally insists on
having what advantage it might later present to him. As yet, a liberal waiver
requirement will not refuse the ignorant or unsuspecting their right to bring
an action under the FELA.
D.P.S.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAW LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO FURTHER LEGIS-
LATIVE INTENT
Four cases decided by the Court of Appeals on the same day present the
judicial interpretation of certain important words in the New York Unemploy-
ment Insurance Law. Section 592, subdivision 1, provides for the suspension of
benefits for a period of seven weeks after loss of employment due to strike,
lockout or other "industrial controversy" in the "establishment" in which
claimant has been employed. Matter of Ferrara"9 held that a controversy caused
by an unauthorized walkout by National Airlines clerks at the Idlewild Airport
office would not preclude payments to National clerks in Manhattan, although
belonging to the same union. Payments were allowed to mechanics and clean-
ers of a different union employed at a hangar 22 miles from the Idlewild office.
Three possible interpretations were presented for the Court's consideration.
The Industrial Commissioner desired a construction of the word "establishment"
broad enough to encompass employees "whose continuance at their jobs has
become useless, or economically wasteful while the strike lasts, and 'because of'
it." National Airlines argued that each metropolitan area constitutes a single
establishment of necessity integrated to sell and provide air transportation.
Claimants sought a narrow construction of the word to make each geographic
location a separate "establishment." It was the claimants' view which prevailed.
The Court reasoned that since the Unemployment Insurance Law was
remedial in nature, to protect workers unemployed through no fault of their
own, it must be given a liberal interpretation. While benefits are suspended to
those directly involved in a strike, to avoid state financing of such strike, this
suspension must be narrowly construed "to effectuate the broad humanitarian
objectives sought to be achieved. . . ." To relate the word to the broad
functions or scattered locations commonplace in our industrial society would
to a great extent defeat the statute's raison d'etre. Also considered was the
legislative resistance to attempts to broaden the meaning of "establishment"
following the Appellate Division decision in Matter of Machincki.30 There, a
strike at Ford Motor Company's Michigan plant did not preclude immediate
benefits to claimants in New York plants laid-off because of it. "Establishment"
was determined from the standpoint of "place where the employee was last
29. 10 N.Y.2d 1, 217 N.YS.2d 11 (1961).
30. 277 App. Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1951).
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employed" rather than of the "efficient production of manufactured products."
Matter of Curatalo3l directly followed the reasoning of Ferrara. Claimant
was employed at the steel fabrication plant of a company which also did steel
erecting on various sites in and around Rochester. A strike by the erectors of
the company, members of a different local of the same union as the fabricators,
caused claimant and twelve others to be laid off at the plant. There was no
picket line at the plant but steel could not cross the lines at the sites. Plant
production continued at a rate of seventy-five percent with only the thirteen
laid off. At all times claimant was able and willing to work at the plant. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the fabrication plant and construction sites
constituted separate establishments so that claimant's benefits were not
suspended.
The third related case decided on May 25 was Matter of Wentworth.3
2
Claimants were carpenters and timbermen employed in making forms for
concrete for a construction firm. A Teamsters' Union strike halted its supply of
concrete from Colonial Sand and Gravel Company. The employer's own dump
truck drivers, who hauled materials within the project, participated in the
industry-wide strike. This latter participation, however, was held not to deprive
claimants of benefits, for to the Court, the "effective action" was that taken by
the Colonial drivers. Therefore, there was no "industrial controversy" within
the establishment causing the layoff.
The above three decisions are clearly indicative of New York's highest
court's intent to construe the Unemployment Insurance Law liberally. Where
a matter of interpretation is presented, it will more often than not be resolved
so as to extend the benefits to those willing and able to work. In this way,
workers and their families will not be hurt by a situation beyond their control
and the legislative rationale behind the Unemployment Insurance Law will be
vindicated.
A similar question was presented to the Court by Matter of Gilmartin.33
Flexicore Precoat, Inc., claimant's employer, was asked by the Lathers' Union
to employ one of its members at a lathe in its plant. Upon refusal, the Union
obtained the aid of the Teamsters' Union whose drivers working for a sister
company, Ryan Concrete Company, refused to deliver concrete to Flexicore.
While Flexicore and Ryan were clearly separate establishments, and the
effective action was taken by Ryan drivers, the Court allowed a suspension of
benefits. The Lathers' Union had made its demand on Flexicore and through the
indirect pressure of the Teamsters had attempted to affect Flexicore. This was
sufficient to show that there was an "industrial controversy" at the establish-
ment in which Gilmartin worked. That the Teamsters' action was an illegal
secondary boycott and not a "labor dispute" for the purpose of gaining an
31. 10 N.Y.2d 10, 217 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1961).
32. 10 N.Y.2d 13, 217 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1961).
33. 10 N.Y.2d 16, 217 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1961).
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injunction under New York Civil Practice Act § 876-a was deemed irrelevant
in interpreting the Unemployment Insurance Law. As noted above, the law
will normally be construed to bring benefits to as many unemployed workers
as possible. This was the apparent legislative intent. But it was also the
legislative intent that state funds not be used to support strikes. The statute was
meant to embody a "reconciliation of the purposes of unemployment insurance
with the principle of government neutrality. '34 This is the other side of the
scale that must be and has been properly balanced by the Court of Appeals.
R.V.B.
ZONING
REGULATION OF UNSAFE USE UPHELD
In Town of Hempstead v. Goldblattl the Court of Appeals upheld an
Appellate Division affirmance 2 of a judgment of Special Term3 against defendants
Goldblatt, and the Builders Sand & Gravel Corp. Over constitutional objections,
an injunction was granted restraining defendants from operating their sand pit
before complying with a new Town Ordinance ostensibly intended to regulate
unsafe uses.
The Court of Appeals first recognized the presumption of constitutionality
of the Ordinance and properly placed the burden on the defendants to overcome
this presumption by proving the unreasonableness of its requirements. De-
fendants had been operating a sand pit since 1927, when the area was primarily
rural. In 1945, a six foot chain link fence topped with barbed wire was erected
around the 38 acre site in accordance with an ordinance passed by the town
that year. Eleven years later, the town sought unsuccessfully to restrain de-
fendants from dredging operation in a zoned area (practically all of defendants'
excavation work is under water). There the trial court allowed the continuation
of business because it was a prior non-conforming use in which defendants had a
substantial investment.
Town Ordinance No. 16, in question here, was amended in 1958 to require,
among other things, that defendants fill in all previous excavation (averaging
25 feet over 20 acres), discontinue excavation below ground water level, place
a concrete footing under the 7000 lineal feet of fencing, and not dredge within
20 feet of any property line, as conditions to obtaining a permit and continuing
operations. Defendant was denied permission to introduce evidence as to the
market value of his property, but there was evidence available to the Court of
Appeals that the business grossed about $200,000 per year, which sum was also
34. Supra note 29 at 8, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
1. 9 N.Y.2d 101, 211 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1961).
2. 9 A.D.2d 936, 196 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dep't 1959).
3. 19 Misc. 2d 176, 189 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959).
